Fault tree analysis is a method for evaluating reliability and availability in terms of equipment system "states", but this method does not lend itself easily to the evaluation of equipment interactions through time. This makes fault trees difficult to use for the analysis of systems whose reliability and availability depend on complex interactions between its sub-systems. This difficulty is overcome by combining fault trees with discrete event simulation methods. The new TRAM methodology combines models and techniques for the analysis of throughput, availability, reliability, and maintainability into a single approach. This paper describes the TRAM methodology and illustrates it with an application to a chemical processing plant.
Fault tree analysis is a method for evaluating reliability and availability in terms of equipment system "states", but this method does not lend itself easily to the evaluation of equipment interactions through time. This makes fault trees difficult to use for the analysis of systems whose reliability and availability depend on complex interactions between its sub-systems. This difficulty is overcome by combining fault trees with discrete event simulation methods. The new TRAM methodology combines models and techniques for the analysis of throughput, availability, reliability, and maintainability into a single approach. This paper describes the TRAM methodology and illustrates it with an application to a chemical processing plant.
TRAM combines fault tree analysis at a low level of the system description and discrete event simulation at a higher level to create a new method for analyzing the availability and throughput capacity of material processing plants. Failure and repair data is modeled stochastically by a very flexible type of finite mixture distribution that allows the analyst to separate the effects of different repair strategies, such as the reliance on procurement of off-site (vs. on-site) spare parts.
An important application of the TRAM method is to facilitate the design of a plant that tolerates outages of its subsystems in the most efficient way possible. Mitigation strategies including in-process storage, alternate work-flows, availability of spare parts, and design for over-production: all of these can be assessed using the TRAM approach, and it thereby facilitates the design of more robust manufacturing systems.
The TRAM methodology enables sophisticated "what-if" analyses of alternative designs, e.g. equipment sets, capacities (tanks sizes), shift schedules, spare parts, etc. to optimize plant design and operation. It is a stochastic, time dependent process that provides probabilities of success (or failure) and confidence bounds on availability and throughput.
Finally, the TRAM methodology can help plant managers and owners to focus on the plant production metrics by which they are compensated, and not solely on abstract metrics such as availability. Accordingly, TRAM is potentially a more influential tool in the industry than conventional RAM methods.
The TRAM method is based on the discrete event formalism developed by Zeigler et al. [1] , and explained further in [2] . In TRAM the plant model is completely separated from the simulation engine and can be specified by input data contained in an XML file. Alternatively, the user can construct connections between sub-system components using a graphical user interface. The GUI is very useful in supporting the verification of the correct mass balance in the model.
INTRODUCTION
In many industries fault tree analysis is a familiar technique used for reliability engineering and for understanding the risks posed by subsystem failures. However, because it omits an explicit representation of time and dynamics, fault tree analysis is difficult to apply to materials production plants. We remove this restriction by combining fault tree analysis and discrete event simulation to understand the reliability and availability of complex production plants. This new method -which we have called TRAM for Throughput, Reliability, Availability, and Maintainability -is used to assess how storage, alternative work flows, and similar aspects of a plant's design interact with the reliability of subsystems in the plant to determine its overall availability and to relate availability to production capacity.
The TRAM method calculates the availability of a system as a product of how its components interact through time. The desirability of such a method has been previously discussed in the reliability literature [4, 5] , and our recent experience with the design of a high availability manufacturing system has again illuminated this need. Central to the TRAM method is the concept of endogenous availability which is described in [6] and quantifies the availability of a complex system solely in terms of its transfer characteristics. The endogenous availability of a system is defined as the ratio of its times to produce a fixed number of items with and without failures. Though endogenous availability can be difficult to calculate, a simple and practical approximation is given by the ratio n/m where m is the number of items produced in a fixed period of time when no component fails and n is the number of components produced in the same time when components do fail.
The TRAM method uses fault tree analysis to build models of subsystems within a plant. The interaction of these subsystems in time is modeled in a discrete event simulator. These two views of the system are linked by random variables that describe how failures and repairs occur in time. A finite mixture model of repair time is employed, motivated by the desire to capture qualitatively distinct repair processes in a single probability density function. This paper describes how fault tree analysis, probabilistic mixture models of failure and repair processes, and discrete event simulation are combined to create this new method for reliability analysis. An illustration of TRAM method is given for a notional chemical processing plant.
FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Fault tree analysis [7] [8] [9] is used to build models of subsystems with components that are tightly coupled in time: examples are hydraulic presses, motorized tracks, and electric circuits. Fault tree analysis has three components: i) fault trees showing how specific events cause the components of a subsystem to fail, ii) reliability block diagrams showing how components of the system are interconnected, and iii) data describing the rates at which those components fail and are repaired. The mean time between failures and mean time to repair of the sub-system are obtained by combining three elements: i) the events in significant paths through the fault tree (i.e., its cut sets), ii) the elements in the reliability block diagram that are affected by the cut set, and iii) the failure rates and repair times for those elements, denoted for the i th component by λ i and τ i respectively.
In a typical analysis, it is assumed that the plant is operating at the steady state and at the bottom of the failure rate versus time curve (also called the "bathtub curve"). The failure rates are modeled by an exponential failure probability density distribution. Moreover, because the components of a sub-system are tightly coupled it is assumed that the failure of a single component causes a failure of the entire sub-system and that the individual component failures are independent. With these assumptions, the mean time between failures (MTBF) of the sub-system is simply the inverse of the sum of the failure rates of its components. Thus,
The mean time to repair (MTTR) of the sub-system is calculated as a weighted average of the mean times to repair of its components. Thus, 1
The roll-up of component mean repair times to estimate sub-system mean repair time is an important intermediate step leading to the development of a discrete event simulation model. The discrete event simulation captures the significant interactions among sub-systems. The simulator uses the data produced by the fault tree analysis to parameterize its failure and repair time distributions, which it uses for Monte-Carlo sampling of the plant's throughput and endogenous availability.
FAILURE AND REPAIR TIME DISTRIBUTIONS
The average rates for failure and repair are used to parameterize two random variables that model the distribution in time of failures and repairs. The distribution of failures is modeled simply by an exponentially distributed random variable that has for its mean the MTBF given by Eqn. 1. The time to repair a sub-system is modeled with a bi-modal random variable that is constructed from two lognormal random variables.
Lognormal random variables are a common choice for modeling the variability of repair time because of its skewed shape and low bound at zero. The two parameters of the lognormal random variable are calculated by specifying two points in the distribution -we select the variable's mean value and its low value (the 1%-tile) -and from these points derive the parameters of the corresponding lognormal distribution.
A single lognormal distribution could be used to model the time required for all repairs. However, some repairs are completed using parts readily available in an inventory of locally stored spares while other repairs require that a replacement part be ordered from some relatively distant location. The time needed to obtain these latter parts significantly increases the total time needed to complete the repair. Indeed, the time required to procure a part from another organization may dwarf the cumulative time needed to diagnose the failure, install the new part, test the installation, and perform all other on-site activities required for the repair.
Given the large discrepancy in the time needed for a repair in these two circumstances, it is natural to model repairs as a two-state process. In the first state, the time to repair the sub-system is determined entirely by tasks performed on-site; this state is for repairs completed with on-site spares. In the second state, the time to repair includes whatever time is needed to procure parts that are not immediately available; this state is for repairs that require off-site spares.
Associated with each state -denoted respectively by onsite spares and off-site spares -is a distinct, lognormal random variable that models the repair time in that case. This two-state model is a finite mixture distribution [10] of the type applicable when repair times are determined by a finite number of randomly occurring sources according to a fixed probability α. The simplest such mixture model is binary. If the probability that a part can be obtained on-site is α, and the probability that the same part must be gotten from an off-site location is (1-α), then we obtain a binary mixture distribution of two lognormals (BMFL): f on and f off . The probability density function q(x) of the distribution BMFL (μ on , σ on , μ off , σ off , α) is
The expected value of q(x) is the weighted average of the mean repair times for on-site and off-site availability of spare parts, specifically
The variance of the binary mixture is also known; it depends not only on the variance of the two component distributions, but also on the separation between the mean values, specifically:
If the masses of two component lognormal distributions are sufficiently separated in the domain then the mixture density function will be bimodal. The lower mode corresponds to the central tendency for repair using on-site spares, whereas the higher mode corresponds to the central tendency for repairs using off-site spares. The area under the curve of the bimodal mixture distribution that falls in the middle can drop off appreciably. Even when the lognormal mixture distribution isn't strictly bimodal the density in the tail is usually expanded compared to a simple lognormal distribution. Fig. 1 shows two components of a bi-modal lognormal distribution. One component is a narrow peaked distribution with a low mean value (solid dark blue line) that represents repair with on-site spares and the other is a relatively flat distribution with a high mean value (solid red line) for repair with off-site spares. In this example, spares are available onsite with probability 0.75. The lognormal mixture (black line) that results from these components is a weighted average that lies somewhat closer to the curve representing repair with onsite spares. The shift of probability mass to the tail reveals an increased sensitivity to unusual but extreme failure events that incur the long delays associated with ordering off-site spares.
This inclusion of spare parts in the model of repair times demonstrates the power of stochastic modeling in reliability simulation analysis. For example, the mixture model permits parametric studies where the probability of obtaining spare parts on-site is systematically manipulated. Such a study could, for example, be used to determine the size of an on-site spare parts inventory that is required to achieve an availability or throughput goal for the system.
DISCRETE EVENT SIMULATION
The evolution of time in a discrete event simulation is accomplished "by a representation in which the state variables change instantaneously at separate points in time," [11] , p.7. In the stochastic version of discrete event simulation, input data and failure events are drawn from probability distributions. Through the application of statistical methods, the analyst is able to account for a wide variety of plausible time evolutions of a complex system instead of only the mean or expected performance of the system.
In the TRAM method, discrete event simulation is used to study the interactions of the plant's sub-systems through time. The simulator reproduces all of the essential steps in a production process, captures the interactions of different processes (e.g., where and when they share equipment), and reveals how all of the subsystems in the plant work-or fail to work-together as it operates.
A discrete event model for analysis of semi-batch plants has five primary elements. Four of these describe the operation of the plant; these elements are 1) shift schedules; 2) flow rates for the primary sub-systems; 3) material dependencies between these sub-systems; 4) storage tanks for intermediate products that separate sub-systems; and 5) the distribution of failures and repairs of sub-systems through
Fig.1. Binary mixture lognormal distribution (dashed line) and its component distributions (blue & red lines) for repair time generate an extended tail (in hours).
time. The fifth item is provided by the fault tree analysis and repair distributions described in the preceding sections. The operation of the plant is modeled by events that are instigated by or act upon each of these items. For instance, the start of a shift causes sub-systems scheduled to work on that shift to draw material from their upstream tanks and place material into their downstream tanks. A failure event causes a sub-system to stop working, thereby halting the flow of material through it. Repair of the sub-system causes the flow of material to resume. The simulation proceeds chronologically through the events that model activities significant to the TRAM analysis, skipping over periods of operation in which no events occur. Fig. 2 illustrates a sequence of events in the simulation. Dark blue areas contain significant events -such as the failure of a sub-system or completion of a repair -that alter the configuration of the plant. At these events, the simulator calculates new flow rates for sub-systems, samples failure and repair distributions to schedule future failures and repairs of sub-systems, and makes other adjustments to the state of the model. The light blue areas are those in which the plant evolves simply between events -for example, when a repair is underway or a tank is filling at a constant rate. The state of the model in these intervals is completely characterizing by its preceding events, and so the simulator skips quickly over an interval of mundane operation to the next period of intense activity.
By focusing on just the significant events in a plant's operation, the simulator rapidly determines the cumulative impact of failures, repairs times, and operating procedures on the plant's productivity over a decade or more. The data produced by several decades of simulated operations are used to draw statistically meaningful conclusions about the plants long-run production capabilities, to estimate its most likely production capability in any given interval, and to identify and rank problematic sub-systems within the plant.
ILLUSTRATION OF THE TRAM METHODOLOGY
The notional plant shown in Fig. 3 is used to illustrate how the TRAM method is used for the analysis of a production plant. The figure shows a simple manufacturing plant with two production stages. The stages are separated by intermediate product tanks. The second stage recycles 5% of its product and the other 95% is output from the plant. The diagram shows failure and repair data for each element in the system: the tanks have the same failure and repair data; the first and second stages have their own intrinsic failure rates and have a common point of failure, which is the electric utility that they rely upon for power. Also shown in the diagram is the Monday through Friday production schedule that is used by both stages.
In the absence of failure, this plant produces approximately 5,400 kilograms of product each year. Our goals are 1) to understand how sensitive the production capacity of the plant is to failure and repair times of its components and 2) to understand how the sensitivity of the plant to the reliability of its sub-systems is reduced by increasing the capacities of the intermediate product tanks. For this purpose we ran twenty computer simulation experiments. Each case considers a combination of failure rates, repair times and tank capacities relative to the baseline shown in Fig.  3 . The failure rates and repair times were scaled up to 110%, 120%, 130%, 140%, and 150% of the baseline values. For each increase of the failure rates and repair times, we simulate the plant with the tank capacities shown in Fig. 3 (i. e., the baseline capacities) and with capacities of 125%, 150%, and 175% of the baseline.
The endogenous availability of the plant in each scenario is plotted in Fig. 4 . This data shows that the plant in its baseline configuration can tolerate up to a 30% increase in failure rates and repair times before it is unable to meet its annual production goal of 5,400 kg. By increasing the sizes of the intermediate tanks by 50%, the plant can be made insensitive to a 40% increase in the failure rates and repair times of its sub-systems; and doubling the capacities of the tanks yields permits a 50% increase in the failure rates and repair times.
This example illustrates the type of insights that can be obtained with the TRAM method. By knowing how the reliability of sub-systems and their interactions through time collectively determine productivity, tradeoffs can be made between sub-system coupling (e.g., in the form of intermediate storage tanks) and reliability in pursuit of a productivity goal. Careful analysis of these tradeoffs can contribute to a reduction of the plant's operating costs, and reduce the risk of unforeseen problems arising from the interaction of equipment reliability and operating procedures. 
